The Microwave Anisotropy Probe (MAP) orbits the second Earth-Sun libration point (L2)--about
cosmic microwave background radiation. To achieve orbit near L2 on a small fuel budget, the MAP spacecraft needed to swing past the Moon for a gravity assist. Timing the lunar swing-by required MAP to travel in three high-eccentricity phasing loops with critical maneuvers at a minimum of two, but nominally all three, of the perigee passes. On the approach to the first perigee maneuver, MAP telemetry showed a considerable change in system angular momentum that threatened to cause on-board Failure Detection and Correction (FDC) to abort the critical maneuver. Fortunately, the system momentum did not reach the FDC limit; however, the MAP team did develop a contingency strategy should a stronger anomaly occur before or during subsequent perigee maneuvers.
Simultaneously, members of the MAP team developed and tested various hypotheses for the cause of the anomalous force. The final hypothesis was that water was outgassing from the thermal blanketing and freezing to the cold side of the solar shield. As radiation from Earth warmed the cold side of the spacecraft, the uneven sublimation of frozen water created a torque on the spacecraft.
Introduction
This paper describes an anomalous force that acted on the MAP Observatory in a puzzling way. For background information, please refer to Bennett, Hinshaw, and Page _ for MAP science, and Markley et al 2 for MAP engineering.
The force acted each time MAP approached perigee in preparation for its crucial orbit-raising maneuvers, and it also appeared at the periselene--the lunar swingby to which those man: euvers directed the spacecraft. The MAP Spacecraft
ConfiCuratlon
The MAP Observatory is composed of three main portions--the instrument, the central truss, and the solar shield. Figure 1 shows the upright spacecraft, with the instrument, its optics, and its large thermal radiators on top of the hexagonal central truss. The passively cooled portions of the instrument operate at a physical temperature of about 60-100 Kelvin (K). Providing a relatively cold and extremely stable thermal environment is crucial to achieving the mission's science objectives.
To the central truss is attached the rest of the vital spacecraft components. At the bottom of the figure, and shown also in Figure 2 , is the solar shield, which comprises the six solar array panels, thermal blankets stretched between those panels, and several components (e.g. Sun sensors) that need to be exposed to the Sun.
A key thermal design feature is that the backside of the solar shield is insulated from the Sunfacing side, improving the passive cooling of the instrument required for science observations.
Also of particular interest in this paper, the coarse Sun sensors (CSS) are located in redundant pairs at the outer ends of the array panels. The CSSs on panels 1, 3, and 5 face toward the Sun at a 57°cant from the XY-plane, and the CSSs on panels 2, 4, and 6 face away from the Sun with the same cant; the cold-side CSSs nominally receive no signal during science operations. Figure  2 shows tile identifying numbers in relation to the spacecraft axes. Figure   3 shows the trajectory followed by MAP as it was guided toward L2.
Nominal Perigee Maneuver Plan
Before each maneuver, MAP was in Observing
Mode, in which it collects science data; the first command to prepare for a maneuver was to exit this mode. The spacecraft was then put into Inertial Mode for the pre-burn period. This mode established the desired attitude--which would be aligned with the correct velocity change (Delta V, or AV) direction at the burn start--in advance via commanded quaternion.
Each perigee pass used a slightly different attitude, but in all cases the spacecraft and its arrays were oriented about 45-50°from the Sun, and the instrument was directed approximately toward nadir at perigee. These factors combined to create an attitude profile that allowed the Sun to heat the instrument and Earth albedo to illuminate the cold side of the solar shield shortly before perigee. These were the only times after launch that these cold surfaces were illuminated At the burn start, the spacecraft was commanded into Delta V Mode, which also used commanded quaternions to follow the correct trajectory. Next,DeltaV Modeautonomously exited into theangular momentum control mode(Delta H) atthecompletion of theburn. Finally, after the DeltaH dumped momentum, a stored command putthespacecraft intoitsSun Acquisition Mode. Figure 4: System momentum profile at the first perigee (PI) maneuver. The time axis displays number of minutes until the time of perigee passage.
Analysis of Anomalous Force
In each case, a negative change in Y-axis momentum was observed first, suggesting a "nose-up" moment (note that this is opposite of aircraft convention, since the MAP +Z-axis pointed upward). This negative Y-axis torque was associated with an increase in the system momentum magnitude.
The nose-up momentum increase was followed by both a negative roll moment (-X-torque) and a nose-down moment (+Y-torque). The Y-axis momentum returned nearly to its original value just before the burn, and the X-axis momentum had a small offset.
While a modified operations plan to guarantee good maneuver performance was being developed, the MAP team was also active in attempting to diagnose the problem to predict the future behavior of the force. The culmination of this effort was a model that accurately predicted the magnitudes of the system momentum changes seen at third perigee (P-final) and periselene. The reasoning used in the elimination of more mundane causes and the development of the accepted theory follow.
Sensor or Actuator Malfunction
During the anomaly, a quick look at other telemetry points suggested that the anomaly was the result of a true torque rather than a sensor or actuator malfunction. Figure 6: Second perigee (P2) system momentum and CSS profiles. Apparent momentum variations before t = -100 minutes were due to reaction wheel scale factor errors; such errors were ruled out as a factor in the anomaly.
Propellant Leak
The possibility of thruster leakage was considered. If any one thruster had been leaking, the resulting change in momentum would have been in one of the eight particular, known thruster torque directions, and would have resulted in a specific combination of X-, Y-and Z-axis changes to momentum. Though the first few minutes of the anomaly allowed the possibility of a leak in thruster 4, which only provides negative pitching moment, the latex" changes in X-axis momentum discounted that hypothesis. 
Operational Considerations
Since it was not known whether the anomalous behavior could recur or possibly worsen at subsequent perigee passes, preparations were made for the disabling of Telemetry and Statistics Monitors (TSM) dealing with system momentum and the possible manual aborting of the next burn.
Because the peak system momentmn change decreased at each subsequent periapse, these special preparations had no effect on the P2 or P-final maneuvers. TSMremained most likelyto abort a maneuver if theanomalous forcecaused a greater system momentum buildup. Thefollowing strategy was adopted tomitigate thisrisk. As partof thesequence of commands used to implement the perigeemaneuver, additional commands wereincluded. The YellowHigh System Momentum TSM wasdisabled before theexpected onset timeoftheanomalous force for tworeasons: (1) to allowa greater level of systemmomentum buildup prior to the maneuver, and(2)tosurvive theinitial transient intoDelta V mode andallowDeltaVtodecrease systemmomentum. The Red High System Momentum TSM was still left in placeto providesafety for thespacecraft. Fiveseconds after the maneuver began, after the initial transient intoDeltaV Mode, theYellowHigh System Momentum TSMwasautonomously reenabled.
In additionto the TSM changes above, contingency procedures were preparedto perform a contingency momentum dumpusing DeltaH Mode before themaneuver, if necessary. Also,plans weremade toresume themaneuver quicklyif prematurely aborted. The Mission Operations Teamclosely monitored thesystem momentum priorto themaneuver tobeready to enactthe contingencies in the eventof a problem. Materials that came into contact with these cold surfaces had a significant capture probability.
At the same time, the sunlit side of the solar shield was very warm and could continue to outgas, as could the blanketing for elements that produced their own heat. Given the observed, pre-launch environmental profile, the effective surface area of blankets, the on-orbit thermal profile, and the venting path and getter geometry, the best estimate of water mass available to settle on the back of the solar shield is in the range of 0.2-1.4 kg.
It was theorized that, once deposited, the frozen water needed to be warmed above about 130 K to have sufficient energy to boil off in high vacuum. Earth IR exposure was thought to be sufficient to sublimate the products on the back of the solar shield during maneuver operations. where kb = 1.38x10 -z3 joules/K, T-150K, m,,,,_= 1.Tx10 -27 kg, and N,,,,. = 18 for H20. For the P1 momentum anomaly, a peak magnitude of about When the +X-axis side of the shield was lit, the water sublimated and imparted a force to that side, resulting in a negative (noseup) pitching moment. Because of orbit geometry, the nadir vector had a small -Y-component in the body frame. The result was that more of the +Y-side of the shield was shaded for longer, there was less sublimation on that side, and the balance of force provided a negative rolling moment.
The time that this force was felt coincided with the lighting of the midpoint coldside CSS 6. Finally, just before the maneuver, the nadir vector moved more into alignment with the -Z-axis (cold side) and the trailing side of the shield became exposed to Earth radiation; as the trailing side was lit, CSS 4 was illuminated, and the sublimation of frozen material created a positive pitching moment approximately equal to the earlier negative moment.
Predictive Modeling
An inverse dependence of mass deposition with time, dm/m = -dt/'r, was expected as the system relaxed by outgassing to its final state. Since each IR heating event was of a similar illumination geometry and thermal profile, it was reasonable to assume that the peak momentum buildup would be proportional to the integral of the mass deposited since the previous event.
Recalling that the material coming into contact with the blankets was frozen, we integrated probability to find the total amount of material available to provide torque at each IR heating encounter.
The integral is given by the expression:
where mo is the total mass of material available for outgassing, r is the outgassing time constant, and n is an index to denote each discrete heating event that clears the surfaces of deposited material.
In Table 2 and Figure 7 below, the observed momentum buildup and the buildup predicted by this simple model are compared. The time constant of r-9 days was appropriate for the geometry and composition of the spacecraft for this portion of the anticipated outgassing profile. This is consistent with data obtained in thermal vacuum testing and previous flight experience.
Conclusions
Between the second and third perigee passes, a clear picture of how water outgassed from the thermal blanketing could be causing the anomalies had emerged. The theory was applied to knowledge of the spacecraft design and prelaunch environment to develop a predictive model. That model indicated that the force would no longer present a threat to the spacecraft; still, the team was ready to respond in case the model was in error. At the third perigee, the momentum levels observed corresponded well with the model (See Figure 8 for a comparison of the three perigee events).
In addition, the model accurately predicted the occurrence of some small changes in system momentum at periselene--an event no one had otherwise foreseen.
By design, thethermal control coatings onthe passivelycooled portionsof the structure radiatively coolmuchfaster thantheoutgassing time scales. For the MAPmission, the time interval between accumulation andsubsequent reheating andejection oftheoutgassing products wascompatible withtheoverall attitude control capability. The maneuvers were,in tile end, untroubled by the anomalies, and MAP is currently operating nominally inorbit near L2. hnportant lessons canbegained fromthisflight experience. Givenactual constraints onability to controlthe pre-launch environment for the spacecraft, theeffect discussed above should be considered inmission design andplanning fora cooledsystem. If ignoreck systems with large, passivelycooled surfacesand significant potential foroutgassing couldexperience a loss oftorque storage or software design margins. In thedesign phase, thiseffect canbemitigated by limitingtheviewofcryogenic surfaces tolikely outgassing vent paths andexploration ofmission profilesthatallowthe system to bakeout in flight prior to tile passivecoolingphase. Alternatively, mission designers couldbuildin periodic dumping by means of IR exposure to limiting thebuildup offiozen material. 
